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Introduction 
Since it emerged in the early 1970s the new institutional economics has been the subject of 
intense debate. As an important part of the new institutional economics, the modern theory of the 
firm – mainly transaction cost economics (TCE) and property rights theory, but also agency the-
ory and team theory – is no exception.1 Much of the debate on the theory of the firm has been 
“internal,” in the sense that it has been conducted between scholars generally sympathetic to the 
new institutional approach (e.g., Hart 1995; Kreps 1996; Maskin and Tirole 1999; Brousseau and 
Fares 2000; Foss and Foss 2001; Furubotn 2002; MacLeod 2002).  
However, there also exists a substantial, though somewhat amorphous, set of “external” cri-
tiques, arising from sociologists, heterodox economists (“old” institutionalist, Austrian, and evo-
lutionary), and management scholars, mainly in the organization and strategy fields. William-
son’s transaction cost economics has been a favorite Prügelknabe for about three decades (e.g., 
Richardson 1972; Hodgson 1989; Perrow 2002), but agency theory has also drawn a fair amount 
of fire (Donaldson 1996). For instance, early critics argued that transaction cost economics ig-
nored the role of differential capabilities in structuring economic organization (Richardson 
1972); neglected power relations (Perrow 1986), trust, and other forms of social embeddedness 
(Granovetter 1985); and overlooked evolutionary considerations, including Knightian uncer-
tainty and market processes (Langlois 1984). Such critiques have been echoed and refined in 
numerous contributions, and criticizing the new institutional economics remains a thriving indus-
try. The incumbents are mainly sociologists (Freeland 2002; Buskens et al. 2003; Lindenberg 
2003) and non-mainstream economists (Hodgson 1998; Loasby 1999; Witt 1999; Dosi and Ma-
rengo 2000), but new entrants are increasingly recruited from the ranks of management scholars 
(Pfeffer 1994), particularly from the strategic management field (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Con-
ner and Prahalad 1996; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Madhok 1996).  
This chapter offers an idiosyncratic review and assessment of this critical literature.2 Our as-
sessment aims to be constructive, in that we ask if the critiques can advance the modern eco-
nomic theory of the firm by identifying weak points, suggesting improvements, and the like. We 
                                                          
1 We ignore here the claim that agency theory and property rights theory should not properly be included in the new 
institutional economics (Brousseau and Fares 2000).  
2 Some of these criticisms echo even older critiques of the neoclassical theory of the firm by Papandreou, Lester, 
Cyert, March, Simon and others. See Foss (2000) for brief discussions of these.  
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do not claim to be comprehensive; unavoidably many authors, papers, and insights must be left 
out. However, we aim to capture what we see as the fundamental critiques. 
We begin with a brief summary of core ideas in the modern economic theory of the firm, 
highlighting the key assumptions at which the critics have concentrated their fire. We turn next 
to the substance of these critiques, focusing on cognitive and behavioral issues, firm heterogene-
ity and production costs, and market characteristics such as path dependence, the survivor prin-
ciple, and other evolutionary issues. As we consider each challenge, we discuss its implications 
for theoretical and applied research on the firm. In other words, we ask what, if anything, each 
critique suggests about how to address the three key explananda of the theory of the firm: exis-
tence, boundaries, and internal organization. 
The Coasian Theory of the Firm 
Coase and Later Work on the Theory of the Firm 
The basic features of the emergence of the theory of the firm are well-known. As the story is 
normally told, the theory of the firm traces its existence back to Coase’s landmark 1937 article, 
“The Nature of the Firm,” with its key conjecture that the main explananda of the theory of the 
firm (existence, boundaries, and internal organization) can be explained by incorporating the 
“costs of using the price mechanism” into standard economic analysis. For various reasons, 
Coase’s seminal analysis was neglected for more than three decades; the analysis was known, 
but not used, as Coase (1972: 68) himself has noted. However, about the same time as Coase’s 
lamentation, serious work on the theory of firm began to emerge, with four seminal contributions 
defining the central streams of research in the theory of the firm, namely transaction costs eco-
nomics (Williamson 1971), the property rights or nexus-of-contracts approach (Alchian and 
Demsetz 1972), agency theory (Ross 1973), and team theory (Marschak and Radner 1972).  
 Of these four approaches, only the transaction costs approach and the property rights ap-
proach are conventionally considered theories of the firm in the strict sense. Neither team theory 
nor principal-agent theory explains the boundaries of the firm, de-fined in terms of asset owner-
ship (Hart, 1995). Such an explanation must presuppose that contracts are incomplete; otherwise, 
everything can be stipulated contractually and there is no need for ownership, the “residual right” 
to make decisions under conditions not specified by contract. Transaction cost economics and 
property rights theory, by contrast, assume that contracts are incomplete, meaning that some con-
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tingencies or out-comes are not specified in the contract. Accordingly, our main emphasis will be 
on the latter two approaches. 3  
A Simple Representation 
The basic incomplete contracting argument is illustrated by the strategic-form games shown 
in Figure 1. We choose this representation not for its own sake, but rather because it brings out 
many of the crucial underlying assumptions in the modern theory of the firm 
 
Figure 1 
   Game 1    Game 2 
 
  B      B  
   left right  left right 
 up  2,2  0,0  up  2,2  0,0  
A      A 
 down  0,0 4,1    down  0,0  4-u,1+u 
 
Following Hurwicz (1972), one can imagine economic agents choosing game forms, and the 
resulting equilibria, for regulating their trade. Efficiency requires that agents choose the game 
form and equilibrium that maximizes the gains from trade. The two players begin by confronting 
Game 1. The problem here, of course, is that the Pareto criterion is too weak to select a unique 
equilibrium, since both {up, left} and {down, right} are Pareto efficient. However, the {down, 
right} equilibrium has a higher joint surplus than the {up, left} equilibrium, so that it will be in 
A’s interest to bribe B to play {right}. Given complete contracting, as in agency theory, u, the 
side payment, can be chosen (1 < u < 2) to implement the equilibrium in which A plays {down} 
and B plays {right}. But under incomplete contracting, side payments may not be sustainable in 
equilibrium.4  
                                                          
3 For expository reasons, we generally suppress the differences between the Williamson’s and Hart’s versions of the 
incomplete-contracting story. Brousseau and Fares (2000) analyze the differences in detail.  
4 For example, if A gives B the bribe before the game begins, B will not play {right}, which means that A will de-
cide not to give B any bribe. Or, A may promise B to pay the bribe after game, but B will realize that this will not be 
in A’s interest, and will still play {left}.  
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The inefficiency may be remedied by contract; for example, A may agree to pay a penalty to 
B if he does not pay u, or B may agree to pay a penalty to A if he does not play {right} after re-
ceiving u. However, such contracts may not always be feasible. Contracts cannot completely 
safeguard against the reduction of surplus or loss of welfare stemming from incentive conflicts 
(given risk preferences). The analytical enterprise is therefore one of comparing alternative con-
tracting arrangements, all of them imperfect. For example, one may compare Nash equilibria that 
result from different distributions of bargaining power (for example, as given by ownership pat-
terns) (Hart 1995).   
Basic Characteristics of the Modern Theory of the Firm 
The above strategic-form representation helps illustrate several crucial underlying assump-
tions of the modern theory of the firm: 
Cognition. Particularly in its formal versions, the theory of the firm follows neoclassical eco-
nomics in making strong assumptions about the cognitive powers of agents. This reflects the de-
pendence of the modern theory of the firm on mainstream information economics and game the-
ory. While bounded rationality is invoked by some writers (particularly Williamson 1985, 1996), 
virtually all the contracting problems studied in the modern theory of the firm can be modeled 
using the more tractable notion of asymmetric information (Hart 1990). Moreover, the Bayesian 
notion of uncertainty underlying game-theoretic models of contracting leaves no room for 
“Knightian,” “deep,” or “radical” uncertainty. In the above representation, players can thus never 
experience genuine surprise.  
Everything is given. Because of strong assumptions about agents’ cognitive powers, modern 
theories of the firm portray decision situations as always unambiguous and “given.” The choice 
of efficient economic organization is portrayed as a standard maximization problem, as in con-
tract design, or as a choice among given “discrete, structural alternatives” (Williamson 1996), as 
in the choice of governance structure. There is no learning, no need for entrepreneurial creation 
or discovery, and explicit room for the emergence of new contractual or organizational forms. In 
the representation above, the strategy spaces are fully specified ex ante.  
Motivation. In the modern theory of the firm motivation is assumed to be wholly extrinsic 
(Frey 1997). Stronger monetary incentives always call forth more effort (in a least a particular 
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dimension). Low-powered incentives play a role only in multi-task agency problem (Holmström 
and Milgrom 1991).  
Explaining economic organization. Problems of economic organization may be represented 
as games where the Nash equilibrium is not Pareto optimal. While this includes some coordina-
tion games, such as the stag-hunt game (Camerer and Knez 1996), the modern theory of the firm 
generally disregards coordination problems. The focus is on aligning incentives, rather than co-
ordinating actions. The function of contracts, hierarchies, reputation, and the like is to give 
agents incentives to choose the strategies that result in a Pareto-superior equilibrium. Transaction 
costs, and not production costs, are seen as the main obstacles to achieving first-best outcomes.  
Methodological individualism. Aggregates play no independent role in explaining economic 
organization. The aim is to explain contractual and organizational form in terms of individual 
actions. Thus, aggregate constructs such as trust, embeddedness, organizational cognition, and 
capabilities are not considered part of the explanans of the modern theory of the firm; moreover, 
they are only seldom treated as explanandum phenomena (an exception is Kreps, 1990, on corpo-
rate culture).  
Mode of explanation. As a first approximation, efficient economic organization is supposed 
to be consciously chosen by well-informed, rational agents. If pressed on the issue, economists 
of organization may also invoke evolutionary processes that are assumed to perform a sorting 
between organizational forms in favor of the efficient ones (Williamson 1985). Thus, explanation 
is either fully “intentional” or “functional-evolutionary” (Elster 1983; Dow 1987).  
What Are the Critics Criticizing?  
Most of the above characteristics are not particular to the economic theory of the firm; they 
also describe any part of game-theoretic microeconomics. Critics of the theory of the firm may 
thus appear simply to be criticizing modern microeconomics more generally. However, while 
this may indeed be the case for some critics, a different interpretation is possible: The critics are 
protesting the application of concepts designed for analysis of market exchange to the study of 
firm organization. While some economists maintain that there is no real difference between firms 
and markets (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Cheung 1983), and most economists would agree that 
the same analytical tools are applicable to firms as well as to markets, the critics seem to argue 
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that firms are essentially different from markets; many of the critics (particularly sociologists) 
argue that firms need to be studied using different tools (Freeland 2002).  
Thus, while some critics may balk at methodological individualism and assumptions of full, 
instrumental rationality in general, they are likely to find such assumptions particularly objec-
tionable when they are applied to the theory of the firm. In the literature that criticizes the mod-
ern theory of the firm firms are often portrayed in rosy terms as “mini-societies” (Freeland 2002) 
that provide “identity” (Kogut and Zander 1996), “higher-order organizing principles” (Kogut 
and Zander 1992), trust relations (Ghoshal and Moran 1996), and collective learning (Hodgson 
1998) that, purportedly, “atomistic” markets cannot provide. Firms exist because and to the ex-
tent that they can supply “identity,” “collective learning,” etc.  
While we are skeptical of such arguments, we acknowledge that they may point to unre-
solved issues and weak spots in the modern theory of the firm. For example, one can reject meth-
odological holism and still hold that there are firm-specific cultures and capabilities, the under-
standing of which is inadequate in the modern theory of the firm (in spite of the efforts of, e.g., 
Kreps 1990). Or one can argue that there is too little room for bounded rationality in this body of 
theory. In the following sections, we discuss and assess a number of such critiques of the modern 
theory of the firm in greater detail.  
Cognitive and Motivational Issues 
Bounded Rationality  
Formal, mainstream economics typically assumes that agents hold the same, correct model of 
the world and that model does not change. The theory of the firm is no exception. More pre-
cisely, these assumptions are built into formal contract theory through the assumption that pay-
offs, strategies, and the like are common knowledge. These assumptions are clearly at variance 
with the notion of bounded rationality (Simon 1955). Indeed, the game-theoretic models used in 
most theoretical research on the theory of the firm ignore bounded rationality altogether, al-
though it may play a role in the “rhetorical” motivation of such research (see Foss 2003). 
In contrast, bounded rationality is often invoked in Oliver Williamson’s (1985, 1996) less 
formal work. “But for bounded rationality,” he argues (1996: 36), “all issues of organization col-
lapse in favor of comprehensive contracting of either Arrow-Debreu or mechanism design 
kinds.” What Williamson calls “comprehensive contracting” does not allow for “governance 
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structures” in the sense of mechanisms that handle the coordination and incentive problems pro-
duced by unanticipated change (Williamson 1996: chapter 4). However, the role of bounded ra-
tionality in Williamson’s work is mainly to provide a reason why contracts are incomplete.5 It is 
a sort of background assumption that while necessary, never really assumes a central role. In-
deed, many critics have observed that to the extent that bounded rationality enters the theory of 
the firm, it is in rather “thin” forms (e.g., Macleod 2000; Foss 2003). The reason is presumably 
that the theory is taken up with comparative institutional exercises, focusing on transaction cost 
economizing, and hence has no room for the process aspects introduced by more substantive no-
tions of bounded rationality (e.g., Furubotn 2002).  
Still, even the rather limited use of bounded rationality in the theory of the firm has been 
criticized. Hart (1990) argues that bounded rationality may not be necessary at all, because 
asymmetric information (in the form of imperfect verifiability) can do the job that bounded ra-
tionality is supposed to do, and can do so more elegantly and more consistently with mainstream 
modeling (see also Posner, 1993). From a different position, Dow (1987) argues that it is incon-
sistent to invoke bounded rationality as a necessary assumption in the analysis of contracts and 
governance structures, and then assume that substantively rational choices can be made with re-
spect to the contracts and governance structures (that are imperfect because of bounded rational-
ity). This point is echoed in Kreps’s (1996) critique of contract theory. Contract theory assumes 
that although the parties to a contract cannot describe the benefits from an exchange relationship, 
they can perfectly anticipate the benefits produced by the different contractual arrangements that 
can structure such a relationship. Of course, this assumption is made to rationalize the ex ante 
choice of ownership or incentive structures. While it may make formal sense (cf. Maskin and 
Tirole 1999), “not everything that is logically consistent is credulous,” as Kreps (1996: 565) la-
conically observes in a comment on Maskin and Tirole. He argues that the Maskin and Tirole 
argument (and virtually all of contract theory) simply takes rationality too far, and that more at-
tention should be paid to bounded rationality.6 
                                                          
5 Therefore, Williamson’s treatment of bounded rationality seldom goes beyond quoting Simon’s dictum that man is 
“intendedly rational, but limitedly so.” He notes that “[e]conomizing on bounded rationality takes two forms. One 
concerns decision processes and the other involves governance structures. The use of heuristic problem-solving … is 
a decision process response” (Williamson 1985: 46). The latter “form” is not central, however, in transaction cost 
economics, which “is principally concerned . . . with he economizing consequences of assigning transactions to gov-
ernance structures in a discriminating way.”  
6 A perhaps deeper problem stems from trying to combine substantive rationality with respect to some variables with 
rationality about other variables that is very bounded indeed. This is problematic, because in reality knowledge of 
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In contrast, bounded rationality has long been a central assumption in organization theory 
(e.g., March and Simon 1958; Cyert and March 1963). In fact, recent critics of the theory of the 
firm have drawn explicitly on these older sources to develop alternative, evolutionary views em-
phasizing the role of bounded rationality in problem-solving, and the role of firms as cognitive 
structures around such problem-solving efforts (e.g., Dosi and Marengo 1994). Other critics, also 
echoing behaviorist organization theory, argue that a key characteristic of firms is that they tend 
to shape employee cognition (Kogut and Zander 1996; Hodgson 1998; Witt 1999). For example, 
starting with social learning theory, Witt (1999) argues that individual cognitive frames are so-
cially shaped and that firms can accomplish such shaping. In particular, entrepreneurs form busi-
ness conceptions that underlie their “cognitive leadership,” making employees internalize and 
collectively share the cognitive categories embodied in the business conception.  
Motivation 
While the role of bounded rationality in the theory of the firm has given rise to a fair amount 
of debate, it is nothing compared to the enormous amount of critical writings on the motivational 
assumptions. Opportunism in particular seems to be the favorite bête-noire. The critique of op-
portunism takes various forms. Empirically, the relevance of opportunism is dismissed by point-
ing to difficulty in observing it, for instance in industrial networks or in long-term associations 
between firms and their suppliers (see, e.g., Håkansson and Snehota 1990). The obvious problem 
with such arguments is that they misunderstand the counterfactual nature of reasoning in the the-
ory of the firm: Opportunistic behavior is seldom observed because governance structures are 
chosen to mitigate opportunism. Another claim is that opportunism is not a necessary assumption 
in the theory of the firm (e.g., Kogut and Zander 1992), but this line of reasoning fails to provide 
convincing alternative accounts.  
According to a more recent and more sophisticated set of arguments, the primary problem 
with the treatment of motivation in the theory of the firm is not opportunism per se, but rather 
that modern economic approaches assume that all motivation is of the “extrinsic” type (Ghoshal 
and Moran 1996; Osterloh and Frey 2000). In other words, all behavior is understood in terms of 
encouragement from an external force, such as the expectance of a monetary reward. (In con-
trast, when “intrinsically” motivated, individuals wish to undertake a task for its own sake). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the former variables (the expected surplus from the relation) is likely to be dependent upon knowledge of the latter 
variables (the sources of the surplus).  
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These arguments do not necessarily deny the reality of opportunism, moral hazard, and so on; 
they assert instead that there are other, better ways of handling these problems besides providing 
monetary incentives, sanctions, and monitoring. The arguments are often based on social psy-
chology (notably Deci and Ryan 1985) and on experimental economics (e.g., Fehr and Gächter 
2000).  
In one version of the argument, Pfeffer (1994) and Ghoshal and Moran (1996) argue that the 
theory of the firm misconstrues the causal relation between motivation (e.g., the tendency to 
shirk) and the surrounding environment (the type of governance structure in place). For example, 
Ghoshal and Moran (1996: 21) claim that individuals within an organization perform not accord-
ing to the incentives and opportunities offered, but to their “feelings for the entity.” “Hierarchi-
cal” controls, they state, reduce organizational loyalty and thus increase shirking. Reliance on 
internal governance in the presence of relationship-specific investments, they hold, causes the 
very problems it is designed to alleviate: Williamson’s approach becomes a “self-fulfilling 
prophecy,” and is therefore “bad for practice.”7 In another version of the argument Osterloh and 
Frey (2000) ask which organizational forms are conducive to knowledge creation and transfer. 
They note that elements of market control (e.g., high-powered incentives) are often introduced in 
firms to accomplish this. However, Osterloh and Frey argue that this only works to the extent 
that there is no “motivation crowding-out effect,” in which extrinsic motivation does not crowd 
out intrinsic motivation. They draw on Deci and Ryan (1985) and other contributions to social 
psychology to argue that motivation may be harmed when agents perceive that their actions are 
subject to external control (as with a performance-pay system). Osterloh and Frey argue that 
forms of internal organization that foster intrinsic motivation can more successfully create and 
transfer tacit knowledge because such activities cannot be compelled, only enabled.  
Challenges to the Theory of the Firm? 
Few economists of organization have reacted to the above critiques. We suspect this is partly 
because taking these critiques seriously means questioning fundamental tenets of mainstream 
                                                          
7 However, while Ghoshal and Moran question the substantial empirical literature supporting Williamson’s theory, 
they offer little systematic evidence for their own view. They simply assert that the strong empirical relationship 
between specific assets and vertical integration exists because these assets reduce the cost of internal organization, 
independent of their effects on the hazards of market governance. They cite Masten, Meehan, and Snyder (1991), 
who have shown that this is a possibility with respect to specific human capital. However, there is no evidence that 
specific physical assets reduce the costs of internal organization, nor do Ghoshal and Moran supply a coherent the-
ory for such an effect.  
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economic modeling. For example, taking bounded rationality seriously opens up a Pandora’s box 
because bounded rationality challenges the game-theoretic foundations underlying the formal 
literature on the theory of the firm (subjective expected utility theory, the independence of payoff 
utilities, the irrelevance of labeling, and common prior beliefs (Camerer 1998)). Organizational 
economists may also question what bounded rationality adds to the theory (Hart 1990). William-
son (1999: 12) notes that “organization can and should be regarded as an instrument for utilizing 
varying cognitive and behavioral propensities to best advantage,” and that the many ramifica-
tions of bounded rationality should be explored to help identify those regularities in decision-
making that differ from the classical von Neumann-Morgenstern-Savage model. The implica-
tions of these regularities for efficient organization can then be developed and incorporated into 
the theory of the firm (Williamson 1999: 18). However, Williamson (1999) mainly emphasizes 
that the findings of cognitive psychology are consistent with “[t]he transaction cost economics 
triple for describing human actors—bounded rationality, farsighted contracting, and opportun-
ism.” Moreover, many bounds on rationality are substantially mitigated by organization, because 
organization has recourse to specialization, which allows for economizing with cognitive effort. 
Such arguments cast doubt on the belief that taking bounded rationality more seriously will yield 
theoretical advances.  
However, a handful of contributions, mainly to contract theory, do try to model agents that 
are boundedly rational in a more substantive sense. For example, Mookerjee (1998) shows how 
ambiguity may lead to incomplete contracting; Carmichael and MacLeod (2003) show that if 
boundedly rational agents care about sunk costs, the hold-up problem may be solved. There are 
various problems with such approaches. Notably, there may be too many “degrees of freedom,” 
in the sense that virtually any cognitive bias may be thrown into a standard contracting model, 
thus producing a nonstandard result. Moreover, how does the theorist decide which manifestation 
of bounded rationality to model? The danger is that one ends up with a string of unconnected and 
extreme partial models with no apparent connection to empirical reality.  
In our opinion, working with alternative motivational assumptions may be a more fruitful 
way forward. It is easier to doctor utility functions than cognitive assumptions. There is estab-
lished social psychology work, the insights of which may be fed relatively directly into modeling 
efforts (and see Benabou and Tirole 2003). Moreover, the implications for economic organiza-
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tion may also seem more immediate (see Lazear 1991; Fehr and Gächter 2000 for concrete ex-
amples).  
Firm Heterogeneity, Capabilities, and Production Costs 
The Knowledge-Based View 
A growing number of writers within heterodox economics (particularly evolutionary eco-
nomics) and strategic management now embrace “capabilities,” “dynamic capabilities,” or 
“competence” approaches (e.g., Winter 1988; Langlois 1992; Kogut and Zander 1992; Foss 
1993; Dosi and Marengo 1994; Teece and Pisano 1994; Langlois and Robertson 1995; Loasby 
1999). We here lump all these together under the heading “knowledge-based view of the firm.” 
Contributions to the knowledge-based view are usually launched on a background of critique of 
new institutional economics, particularly Williamson’s version of TCE. The critique concerns 
the reliance on opportunism and the neglect of differential capabilities (i.e., firm heterogeneity) 
and dynamics (e.g., Winter 1988; Langlois 1992; Kogut and Zander 1992).  
In contrast, contributors to the knowledge-based view typically begin from the empirical 
generalization that firm-specific knowledge is sticky and tacit and develops through path-
dependent processes. This implies that organizations are necessarily limited in what they know 
how to do well.8 Differential capabilities imply differences in terms of the efficiency with which 
resources are deployed.  Superior capabilities, if hard to imitate, can generate long-lived rents 
(Lippman and Rumelt 1982; Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993). Beginning perhaps 
with Kogut and Zander (1992) and Langlois (1992), adherents of the knowledge-based view 
have also argued that the characteristics of capabilities that make them relevant to the study of 
competitive advantage are also crucial for the study of the main issues in economic organization. 
Thus, knowledge-based writers argue that a theory of the firm should be based on considerations 
of knowledge, rather than incentives, opportunism, and transaction costs.  
The Knowledge-Based View as a Theory of Economic Organization 
The idea that knowledge matters for economic organization is hardly new. George B. 
Richardson (1972) suggested that we begin, not from the Coasian idea of transaction costs, but 
                                                          
8 Large parts of the knowledge-based view implicitly and sometimes explicitly subscribe to methodological collec-
tivism (e.g., Kogut and Zander 1992; Hodgson 1998).  
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from the idea that production can be broken down into activities underpinned by firm-specific 
capabilities. Some activities are similar, in that they draw on the same general capabilities; 
activities can be complementary, in that they are connected in the chain of production; and 
similarity and complementarity may obtain to varying degrees. The main point in Richardson 
(1972) is that the boundaries of the firm are strongly influenced by these dimensions of 
activities.9 However, it is unclear in Richardson’s paper how exactly capabilities are supposed 
to influence economic organization.  
Some papers (e.g., Kogut and Zander 1992; Langlois 1992) argue that differential 
capabilities give rise to different production costs, and that such cost differentials may crucially 
influence the make-or-buy decision. Thus, firms may internalize activities because they can 
carry out these activities in a more production (not transaction) cost-efficient way than other 
firms are capable of. The factors that make capabilities distinctive and costly to imitate (e.g., 
complexity and tacitness) also make such differences in production costs long-lived. Thus, one 
firm’s agents may literally fail to understand what another firm wants (for example, in supplier 
contracts) or is offering (for example, in license contracts). The costs of making contacts with 
potential partners, of educating potential licensees and franchisees, of teaching suppliers what it is 
one needs from them, etc.—what Langlois (1992) christens “dynamic transaction costs,” to 
distinguish them from the transaction costs usually considered in the theory of the firm—may 
influence where the boundaries of the firm are placed.  
Knowledge-based writers also claim that the existence of the firm can be explained in knowl-
edge terms and without invoking opportunism (Hodgson 2004). Demsetz (1988) argues that 
firms exist for reasons of economizing on expenditures on communicating and coordinating 
knowledge. Thus, the employment contract, and hierarchy more generally, may exist because it 
is efficient to have the less knowledgeable being directed by the more knowledgeable. A very 
different argument is forwarded by Kogut and Zander (1992) who argue that firms exist because 
they can create certain assets—such as learning capabilities or a “shared context”—that markets 
purportedly cannot create:  
organizations are social communities in which individual and social expertise is trans-
formed into economically useful products and services by the application of a set of 
                                                          
9 For example, closely complementary and similar activities are best undertaken under unified governance, whereas 
closely complementary but dissimilar activities are normally best undertaken under some sort of hybrid arrangement 
(to use Williamson’s (1996) terminology). 
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higher-order organizing principles. Firms exist because they provide a social commu-
nity of voluntaristic action structured by organizing principles that are not reducible to 
individuals (Kogut and Zander 1992: 384). 
This view, they claim, “differs radically from that of the firm as a bundle of contracts that serves to 
allocate efficiently property rights.” Firms’ advantages over markets derive from their being able to 
supply “organizing principles that are not reducible to individuals” (1992: 384).  
The problem with this argument is that it does sufficiently characterize firms: Markets can also 
cultivate learning capabilities and shared context (as in industrial districts, for instance). Moreover, 
embeddedness of the kind that Kogut and Zander talk about does not require firm organization: in a 
moral utopia, characterized by the absence of opportunistic proclivities, the gains from embedded-
ness could be realized over the market. Agents could simply meet under the same factory roof, own 
their own pieces of physical capital equipment or rent it to each other, and develop value-enhancing 
“organizing principles” (to use Kogut and Zander’s term) among themselves, or in other ways inte-
grate their specialized knowledge (as a team). Firms would not be necessary.10  
Challenges to the Theory of the Firm? 
While we are skeptical of the specific knowledge-based explanations for economic organiza-
tion, we acknowledge that the knowledge-based view does point to some weak points in the the-
ory of the firm.11 For example, differential capabilities probably do play a role in determining the 
boundaries of the firm (Walker and Weber 1984; Monteverde 1995; Argyes 1996). However, 
there are two major problems in this area that may hinder progress. The first is that the nature of 
the central construct (i.e., capabilities) itself is highly unclear. It is not clear how capabilities are 
conceptualized, dimensionalized, and measured, and it is not clear how capabilities emerge and 
are changed by individual action (Felin and Foss 2004). The second problem partly follows from 
                                                          
10 Moreover, even in an opportunism-prone world, there may be much embeddedness “outside” firms, as it were, for 
example, in single industries, in firm networks, industrial districts, etc., depending on the presence of various control 
and enforcement mechanisms.  
11 In a recent paper, two leading theorists of the firm, Bengt Holmström and John Roberts (1998: 90) observed that 
“[I]nformation and knowledge are at the heart of organizational design, because they result in contractual and incen-
tive problems that challenge both markets and firms. . . . In light of this, it surprising that leading economic theories . 
. . have paid almost no attention to the role of organizational knowledge.” Similarly, Coase (1988: 47) has lamented 
that in his 1937 paper, he “did not investigate the factors that would make the costs of organizing lower for some 
firms than for others.”  
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the first: the mechanisms between capabilities and economic organization are unclear (Heiman 
and Nickerson 2002; Foss 2005).  
One of the few attempts to provide such a mechanism is Langlois (1992), who gives a key 
role to dynamic transaction costs. In other words, economizing with costs of communication 
(i.e., dynamic transaction costs) is a possible determinant of the boundaries of the firm (and see 
Monteverde 1995 for this). More generally, the genuine challenges that the knowledge-based 
view represents has more probably more to do with the non-standard transaction problems relat-
ing to the exchange of knowledge than with the fuzzy notion of “firm capability.” In other words, 
exchanging knowledge may lead to contractual frictions and hazards that do not involve oppor-
tunism and it may involve transaction costs that have nothing to do with misaligned incentives 
and everything to do with costly communication.  
Entrepreneurship 
A major problem with modern economic theories of the firm is that they ignore the entrepreneur 
(Furubotn 2002; Foss and Klein 2005). Thus, Furubotn (2002: 72-3) points out that “profit is always 
in the background of TCE analysis because it is impossible to say whether a particular action (and 
contractual arrangement) undertaken by the firm is desirable or not purely on the basis of the costs 
of transacting. . . . There is reason, then, to give greater consideration to the question of how profits 
are generated.” And this leads to the theory of entrepreneurship. However, in the modern theory of 
the firm reference to entrepreneurship is passing at best. These approaches are largely static and 
“closed,” meaning that they focus on solutions to given optimization problems.12 
Concepts of Entrepreneurship  
Probably the best-known concept of entrepreneurship in economics is Schumpeter’s (1934) idea 
of the entrepreneur as innovator, who introduces “new combinations” — new products, production 
methods, markets, sources of supply, or industrial combinations — shaking the economy out of its 
previous equilibrium. Entrepreneurship can also be conceived as “alertness” to profit opportunities. 
While present in older notions of entrepreneurship, this concept has been elaborated most fully by 
                                                          
12 Agency theory, for example, has generated important insights on the effects of incentives on effort and the relationship 
between incentive pay and risk. In explaining how a principal gets an agent to do something, however, the theory over-
looks the more fundamental question of what the principal should want the agent to do, or indeed, how the principal got 
to be a principal in the first place. 
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Kirzner (1973). Kirzner’s formulation emphasizes the nature of competition as a discovery process: 
the source of entrepreneurial profit is superior foresight—the discovery of something (new products, 
cost-saving technology) un-known to other market participants. Success, in this view, comes not 
from following a well-specified maximization problem, but from having some knowledge or insight 
that no one else has. None of these accounts, however, links entrepreneurship closely to the theory 
of the firm. Small-business management is only one manifestation of entrepreneurship. Creativity, 
innovation, and alertness are undoubtedly important, but neither activity must take place within a 
firm. Charismatic leaders work with teams, but need not own physical assets, around which the 
boundaries of the firm are drawn.  
Putting Entrepreneurship into the Theory of the Firm 
Various attempts to put entrepreneurship into the theory of the firm exist (e.g., Langlois and 
Robertson 1995; Casson 1997). An attempt that stays relatively close to the new institutional theory 
of the firm is Foss and Klein (2005). They outline an alternative account of entrepreneurship as 
judgmental decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. Judgment refers primarily to business 
decision-making when the range of possible future outcomes, let alone the likelihood of individual 
outcomes, is generally un-known (what Knight [1921] terms uncertainty, rather than mere probabil-
istic risk). The concept of entrepreneurship as judgment has a direct and natural link to the theory of 
the firm. Because markets for judgment are closed, the exercise of judgment requires starting a firm; 
moreover, judgment implies asset ownership. In this approach, resource uses are not data, but are 
created as entrepreneurs envision new ways of using assets to produce goods. The entrepreneur’s 
decision problem is aggravated by the fact that capital assets are heterogeneous, and it is not imme-
diately obvious how they should be combined. Asset ownership facilitates experimenting entrepre-
neurship: acquiring a bundle of property rights is a low cost means of carrying out commercial ex-
perimentation. Moreover, important features of internal organization such as delegation and contrac-
tual incompleteness can be understood in terms of employers’ attempts to facilitate “productive” 
entrepreneurship while discouraging non-productive forms of decision-making. In short, firm 
boundaries and internal organization may be understood as responses to entrepreneurial processes of 
experimentation.  
Challenges to the Theory of the Firm? 
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Will these insights be incorporated into the economic theory of the firm? Because these con-
cepts lie fundamentally outside the standard constrained optimization framework, they are inher-
ently difficult to model mathematically. Modern economists have difficulty appreciating ideas 
that are not expressed in this familiar language. Indeed, most recent theoretical advances in the 
economic theory of the firm have been developed within the more formal framework associated 
with Grossman, Hart, and Moore (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990), not the more 
“open” framework associated with Williamson.13 Relaxing this constraint may lead to consider-
able advances in economists’ understanding of the firm.  
Process Issues 
Path Dependence 
The claim that the theory of the firm, because of its emphasis on efficiency at a point of time 
and on cross-sectional variation, is ahistorical and neglects process has often been made by 
economists and management scholars within both the knowledge-based and the evolutionary 
perspective. Thus, according to Winter (1988: 178): 
In the evolutionary view—perhaps in contrast to the transaction cost view—the size 
of a large firm at a particular time is not to be understood as the solution to some or-
ganizational problem. General Motors does not sit atop the Fortune 500 … because 
some set of contemporary cost minimization imperatives (technological or organiza-
tional) require a certain chunk of the U.S. economy to be organized in this manner. 
Its position at the top reflects the cumulative effect of a long string of happenings 
stretching back into the past.” 
One way to interpret this critique is that the theory of the firm seeks to explain the govern-
ance of individual transactions (Williamson 1996), or clusters of attributes (Holmstrom and Mil-
grom1994), without identifying how the governance of a particular transaction may depend on 
how previous transactions were governed. Argyres and Liebeskind (1999) term this historical 
dependency “governance inseparability.” Where governance inseparability is present, firms may 
rely on governance structures that appear inefficient at a particular time, but which make sense as 
part of a longer-term process. Changes in governance structure affect not only the transaction in 
question, but the entire temporal sequence of transactions. This may make organizational form 
appear more “sticky” than it really is. 
                                                          
13 Bajari and Tadelis (2001) is a prominent exception.  
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This criticism will sound familiar to Austrian and evolutionary economists, who have long 
argued for a “process” view of economic activity that takes time seriously (Hayek 1948 Kirzner 
1973; Dosi 2000). Hayek (1948) distinguished between the neoclassical economics notion of 
“competition,” identified as a set of equilibrium conditions (number of market participants, char-
acteristics of the product, and so on), and the older notion of competition as a rivalrous process. 
Practices that appear inefficient or even anticompetitive at a given moment are better understood 
as part a process of competition through time; it is the process that should be evaluated in wel-
fare terms, not the conditions that obtain at a particular moment in the process  
Williamson (1996), recognizing the need to incorporate history into transaction cost econom-
ics, has introduced the notion of remediableness as a welfare criterion. The outcome of a path-
dependent process is suboptimal, he argues, only if it is remediable—that is, an alternative out-
come can be implemented with net gains. Merely pointing to a hypothetical superior outcome, if 
it not attainable, does not establish suboptimality. Thus, a governance structure or contractual 
arrangement “for which no superior feasible alternative can be described and implemented with 
expected net gains is presumed to be efficient” (Williamson 1996: 7) (for a critique, see Furubotn 
2002: 89-90). 
Selection and Survival: Are all Organizations “Efficient”? 
The explanation of economic organization in terms of efficiency has been one of the most 
frequently criticized characteristics of the theory of the firm: Assuming that agents can figure out 
the efficient organizational arrangements seems to collide with the assumption of bounded ra-
tionality (Dow 1987; Furubotn 2002). Presumably in response to this problem, early work in the 
theory of the firm often explicitly assumed that market forces work to cause an “efficient sort” 
between transactions and governance structures, an assumption that is not in general tenable.  
While appealing to market selection, Williamson (1988: 174) also clearly recognizes that the 
process of transaction cost economizing is not automatic. Still, he maintains that the efficiency 
presumption is reasonable, offering the argument that inefficient governance arrangements will 
tend to be discovered and undone.14 Clearly, this assumption is not an innocuous one. It is in fact 
a key underlying assumption in virtually all empirical work in the theory of the firm. A general 
                                                          
14 Concerning vertical integration, for example, Williamson (1985: 119-20) writes that “backward integration that 
lacks a transaction cost rationale or serves no strategic purposes will presumably be recognized and will be undone,” 
adding that mistakes will be corrected more quickly “if the firm is confronted with an active rivalry.” 
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problem with the empirical literature on organizational form is that we usually observe only the 
business arrangements actually chosen. However, if these arrangements are presumed to be effi-
cient, then we can draw inferences about the appropriate alignment between transactional charac-
teristics and organizational form simply by observing what firms do. The problem is that the ef-
ficiency assumption has always been taken as an essential, but untested, background assumption.  
In one of the few attempts to grapple empirically with the efficiency assumption, Lien and 
Klein (2004) examine the assumption that decisions or behaviors that occur frequently in a popu-
lation of competitive firms are on average more efficient than those that occur rarely. They con-
duct the test in the context of corporate diversification. If the survivor principle holds, those pairs 
of industries most frequently combined within firms (“related” businesses) should tend to repre-
sent more efficient combinations than those pairs that are rarely combined. As firms strive to im-
prove their performance, they tend to exit “unrelated” industries, that is, industries that are poor 
matches for their other businesses. Using detailed data on firms’ business portfolios from the 
AGSM/Trinet database for the early 1980s, Lien and Klein (2004) show that the survivor-based 
measure of relatedness is a strong predictor of exit, even when controlling for other firm and in-
dustry characteristics that might affect the decision to withdraw from a particular industry. Dur-
ing that period, then, the competitive selection process did tend to filter out inappropriate busi-
ness combinations.15  
Another approach is to see if “appropriately” organized firms—that is, firms organized along 
the lines recommended by the theory of the firm—outperform the feasible alternatives. Several 
papers in the empirical TCE literature use a two-step procedure in which organizational form (in 
particular, the relationship between transactional characteristics and governance structure) is 
endogenously chosen in the first stage, then used to explain performance in the second stage. By 
endogenizing both organizational form and performance this approach also mitigates the selec-
tion bias associated with OLS regressions of performance on firm characteristics.16  
These evolutionary approaches shed considerable light on the processes by which organiza-
tions adapt and change, along with the costs of misalignment or maladaptation. However, reli-
                                                          
15 However, the early 1980s was a period of corporate refocus and de-conglomeration (Bhide 1990; Shleifer and 
Vishny 1991) and exit decisions during this period may reflect fashion and herd behavior, not efficiency. Moreover, 
though the findings support using the efficiency assumption in research on diversification, it may not hold for other 
decisions, such as the choice between market and hierarchical governance. 
16 Some representative papers using a two-stage approach (such as Heckman’s selection model) in this fashion are 
Masten, Meehan, and Snyder (1991) and Saussier (2000). 
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ance on evolutionary models introduces additional problems. In many cases, survival may not be 
the best measure of performance, compared with profitability or market value. Poorly performing 
firms may survive due to inefficient competitors, regulatory protection, or legal barriers to exit 
such antitakeover amendments or an overprotective bankruptcy code. In short, efficient align-
ment between transactions and governance should be expected only if the selection environment 
is strong. Moreover, when market conditions change rapidly and unexpectedly, ex post survival 
may not be a good measure of ex ante efficiency; a particular organizational form may be right 
for the times, but the times change. Indeed, the optimal organizational forms may be those that 
adapt most readily to new circumstances (Boger, Hobbs, and Kerr 2001).  
Conclusion 
Almost two decades ago Milgrom and Roberts (1988: 450) argued that the “incentive-based 
transaction costs theory has been made to carry too much of the weight of explanation in the the-
ory of organizations,” and predicted that “competing and complementary theories” would 
emerge, “theories that are founded on economizing on bounded rationality and that pay more at-
tention to changing technology and to evolutionary considerations.” However, despite the impor-
tance in the management literature of knowledge-based or capabilities theories of the firm, this 
body of thought cannot yet be considered a serious competitor to the “incentive-based transac-
tion costs theory.” No other serious competitors have emerged.  
There are many reasons for this. One possible reason is that the conventional theory of the 
firm is sufficiently successful, theoretically and empirically, that competitors have a hard time 
gaining a foothold. Still, as we have stressed throughout this chapter, many of the critiques do in 
fact point to weaknesses in the theory of the firm that should ideally be remedied. A further rea-
son is that the critics tend to focus on phenomena that are difficult to model, phenomena that are 
not readily “tractable” in the sense familiar to mainstream economists. Innovation, entrepreneur-
ship, bounded rationality, learning, evolutionary processes, and differential capabilities are ex-
amples of such phenomena. We should not expect to see these phenomena integrated into the 
mainstream economic theory of the firm until the formal tools that can handle them have been 
developed. Moreover, the empirical literature supporting the challenges outlined above tends to 
be idiosyncratic, based on experimental or qualitative work rather than the standard econometric 
analysis familiar to economists. Finally, the various critiques are not separate but overlapping or 
complementary. For example, the claim that the theory of the firm neglects bounded rationality is 
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very close to the claim that it ignores differential capabilities, learning, and path dependence. In 
turn, the complaint that the theory of the firm neglects the latter phenomena is closely related to 
concerns that it assumes, uncritically, that selection forces operate to produce efficiency. In other 
words, the critiques come in a package, so that embracing one critique may be taken as embrac-
ing the rest — which would mean abandoning the theory of the firm as we know it.  
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